

12 AUG 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Senate Select Committee Request

1. Reference is made to a 7 August 1975 request of Mr. Elliot Maxwell, Senate Select Committee Staff, to [redacted] Office of Security, for certain documents from the Office of Security files on ARTICHOKE.

2. Forwarded herewith are two copies of certain documents requested by Mr. Maxwell. These documents are being forwarded without sanitization since the documents directly involve DD/S&T or DDO matters. Additional documents from the ARTICHOKE files will be forwarded as soon as processing can be completed.

[redacted]
Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

Att

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee, w/2 att
- 1 - A/DDA, w/o att
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- 2 - DD/PSI, w/1 att

OS/PSI/SAG/[redacted] hjd (8 Aug 75)

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OS 50548

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT: Operational Use of Chemical Agents

1. The committee appointed by you in the above-captioned matter recommends the following policy:

"In certain operational situations which warrant the employment of extraordinary measures to attempt to obtain an objective not obtainable by ordinary means, the use of chemical agents is permissible. It is the policy of CIA not to use any chemical agents to secure information against the will of a subject where it may reasonably be expected to cause the subject lasting mental or physical harm as contrasted to possible temporary discomfort. Chemical agents may be used only after certification by the Chief of Operations that their use is in the national interest. [redacted] A permanent supervisory committee composed of a representative of the Medical Staff, Office of Security, TSS, FI Staff and CI Staff shall consider each use of chemical agents and will in each case make appropriate recommendations to the Chief of Operations for his assistance in making the decision relative to the use of chemical agents. Except for medical reasons, ~~no~~ chemical agents will be used on any staff officer or employee of CIA or U. S. employees of [redacted] any other agency without (a) the consent of the employee, (b) a [redacted] certification by the Chief, Medical Staff, that the chemical agent

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will not cause any mental or physical damage to the employee,

(c) after (a) and (b) are completed, the recommendation will be submitted to the advisory committee for consideration and recommendation through the Chief of Operations to the DDCI, and (d) approval by the DDCI.

"Since chemical agents are still in an experimental stage as to the scope of their ultimate use, the recommendation for use in any particular case should be made on the basis of need and national interest. The cost factor in this experimental phase is of secondary consideration.

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"The permanent advisory committee will make recommendations to the Chief of Operations for his assistance in determining whether research ~~should be conducted~~. While it is the policy of the Agency to determine the best chemical agents which may be used to accomplish these extraordinary operational objectives, all such research must first be approved by the Chief of Operations."

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2. It is recommended that the Director issue the above policy statement to you in one copy which will constitute your Agency charter and responsibility for chemical agents.

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3. A memorandum from the DCI to you in original only is attached for your convenience in the event that you concur in this recommendation.

4. It is recommended that you issue the following directive to each Division Chief:

An advisory
"A ~~temporary~~ committee composed of a representative of the Medical Staff, Office of Security, TS3, FI Staff, and chaired by the Deputy Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, is established for the purpose of recommending to me concerning the use of chemical agents for the purpose of obtaining information or attaining operational objectives. All requests for the use of chemical agents will be submitted to the chairman of this committee. The committee will then recommend to me as follows:

- chemical agents
- "a. Whether or not/~~drug~~ should be used;
chemical agent
- "b. The specific/~~drug~~ to be used which is most likely to accomplish the desired results;
- "c. The estimated risk factors, if any, involved in its use;
- "d. The procedure and circumstances under which the chemical agent is to be administered; and
- "e. Any other factor which might assist Chief of Operations in making a decision that the use of the ~~drug~~ chemical agent is in

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the national interest. The committee will not attempt to judge the value of the results expected as a result of the use of the chemical agent, but only the likelihood of achieving these results.

"The use of chemical agents is very sensitive. It is requested that you brief appropriate senior members of your staff only of the fact that this committee has been created and that any request for the use of chemical agents will be submitted to the chairman of the committee, who will furnish guidance as to procedures and information necessary for the committee to make recommendations to me.

"Since chemical agents are still in an experimental stage as to the scope of their ultimate use, a recommendation for use in any particular case should be made on the basis of need and national interest. The cost factor in this experimental phase is of secondary consideration."

5. The committee recommends that you instruct the Cable Secretariat to automatically distribute to the chairman of this committee a copy of all cable communications which discuss or recommend the use of chemical agents in connection with operations. In the event you concur, a memorandum to the Cable Secretariat is attached for your convenience.

6. In order for the committee to properly consider the operational use of chemical agents, it is believed necessary that we review the results of each past use by this Agency either operationally or experimentally. Both TSS and the Office of Security feel that your authority is required before this information can be released to the committee. A letter of authority is attached for your consideration.

7. For your information, the committee at future meetings, in addition to the action indicated previously in this memorandum, intends to review the research which has been conducted to date in the chemical agent field to consider what, if any, new research may be desirable in order to determine if there may be chemical agents adaptable to operational use which are not currently being used by CIA. TSS is somewhat concerned that this committee will overlap and duplicate the work of other committees with the result that they will have more than one channel of guidance in the chemical agent field. It is recommended that you issue the following guidance to this committee:

"In your consideration of the elements outlined by me in paragraph 2 of my memorandum of 14 March 1958 in the above-captioned matter, you may disregard any existing committee ~~for~~ having current jurisdiction or authority in the chemical agent field.

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Your final recommendations should include either the abolishing of present overlapping committees or the creation of a new committee, or the placing of authority in one existing committee. It is my desire that you make such recommendations as you feel appropriate which will best accomplish the objectives of the committee as set out in the memorandum referred to above."

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
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Cable Secretary

SUBJECT:

The Deputy Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, will be placed on distribution of all recommendations for the operational use of chemical agents.


Chief of Operations, DD/P

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**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
Chief, Technical Services Staff**

1. You are authorized to reveal to the committee appointed by me to consider the use of chemical agents the details of each operational and experimental use of chemical agents which has been conducted by you directly or or through contract.

2. The committee feels that it is essential, in order to properly consider and make recommendations to you, that it be informed concerning the success or failure of each past operational use of chemical agents. A memorandum granting appropriate authority to the chairman of the committee to obtain this information is attached.


Chief of Operations, DD/P

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STATINTL

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		JAN 5 Jan 62	
TO:		11:30 AM	
Colonel Edwards			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
REMARKS:			
<p>[] called and left the following message:</p> <p>He had discussed a certain matter with [] some time ago and he called [] again this morning. Dr. [] arranged with EE to release a copy of a cable to you. (IN 45528). This has a bearing on some other material he became aware of with our office. After you have read the cable, he would like you to call him. (I requested the cable from FSS. They haven't received it as yet but will get it for you.)</p>			
FROM:			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO : 1957-O-439445

(47)

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A confidential informant of known reliability at [redacted] *ingrained*

learned unofficially from a military intelligence type that an important case (penetration) was broken not because of a polygraph as reported but was achieved by a chemical or drug (something) given to the penetration orally. Whatever was given a confession apparently resulted. *966*

Source, in addition, reported that military intelligence has opened up a program all over the world using this new technique. Source also reported that two high ranking officers from the Pentagon plus a medical officer conducted the above and administered this new technique in the aforementioned case. Source in passing information reported that this is highly sensitive business and extreme caution must be used to avoid any disclosures.

Inquiry unofficially from our friends, Sid G. et al. indicates no knowledge of same.

One of our very closest medics has no specific information but thinks it may be something of the amphetamine family. This medic indicates that there is a new chemical which might be the one being used. This chemical referred to has been manufactured by a major pharmaceutical outfit and was o.k.'d by Federal Drug Administration approximately three weeks ago. Apparently the Veterans Administration also has run tests on it. Possibly NIH may have some idea with

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[REDACTED] knowledgeable. It has also been learned that the Department of Defense did not have any mechanism for conducting tests on this chemical.

Another source has indicated that this same chemical was approved by Federal Drug Administration on 20 July 1961.

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM	
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP	
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS INITIALS DATE
1	R. L. B. <i>RLB</i> 17 Apr.
2	<i>Mr.</i>
3	
4	
5	
6	
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION SIGNATURE
Remarks:	
<p>I obtained this by "accident". This looks like an artichoke case or P-1. I didn't know whether you had seen it or not.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"></p> <p><i>Check with as to consideration of action.</i></p>	
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER	
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

FORM NO. 237
1 APR 55

Replaces Form 30-4 which may be used.

(40)
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1955—O—342531

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TOP SECRET

8 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Medical Staff
Director of Security
Chief, TSS
Chief, FI Staff

SUBJECT: Policy and Procedures for the Use of
Drugs in Connection with the DD/P Mission

3 pages


Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

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
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TOP SECRET

14 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, CI Staff

SUBJECT: Policy and Procedures for the Use of Drugs
in Connection with the DD/P Mission


Acting Deputy Director/Plans

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

STATINTL

TO :

FROM :

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SUBJECT :

DATE:

11 May 56

this?

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can you get more info on this before
we take it up with [redacted] if
not, then we may have to work
with just this.

JB

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <i>KL 13</i>		<i>5-14-56</i>
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p><i>Note area outlined in red.</i></p> <p><i>Don't this activity which under ARTI CHSKE requires print 50-Mile-PP/P approval?</i></p>		
FROM: <i>ATJ</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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7 May 1956

Minutes of the GEMILLTOP Working Committee Meeting, held 12 April 1956, at 1000 hours.

Members present were:

25X1A	[redacted] (Chairman)	TSS/CD
25X1A	Dr. Sidney Gottlieb	C/TSS/CD
	[redacted]	TSS/CD
		TSS/CD
		DC/EL/PI
		C/CTR/ARC
		SR Division
		FP/PAG Staff
		FI Plans
		C/MS/PUD
		CSI
		C/TSS/TO
	[redacted] (Secretary)	TSS/CD

25X1A [redacted] opened the meeting by reading points from the original GEMILLTOP Charter, restating goals, aims, needs to be served, and definition of the project.

It was reported that since the last meeting, attempts had been made to contact members of the Working Committee individually to discuss aspects of the program of special interest. However, changes in the Committee membership had occurred and some present needed orientation.

Report was offered on completed or near-completed projects. These included the final report on the Brainwashing Study now in press and the study on Chinese behavior patterns which has completed collection of data. It was indicated that the latter project would be completed by 1 July 1956.

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[redacted] indicated that further data would be distributed at a later date.

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[redacted] and Dr. Gottlieb reported on the brain studies now ongoing at Cornell University Medical School. Some preliminary findings were reported and it was indicated the studies would continue.

The area of hypnosis was discussed. It was agreed that considerable interest in this area existed in the Agency, but that the interest was greater than the actual operational need. An objective here will be to attempt to assemble a systematic paper bringing together various views and uses. [redacted] inquired as to who and how much time was involved in the study of hypnosis. It was indicated that two small projects were now ongoing and that a third project was in the proposal stage. Dr. Gottlieb indicated that the studies were modest and went about as far as the Agency needed. [redacted] Division, indicated that his office had kept on top of the subject for many years.

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[redacted] indicated that September to April was too long a time between meetings and that in order to evaluate the activity more contact was necessary. [redacted] indicated that he would work as closely as possible with [redacted] and that it was the

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intention to see if there could be more frequent meetings with Working Committee members. It was indicated that it was believed the entire Working Committee should meet at least twice a year, but that there should be more frequent contacts with individual members.

Hypnosis was discussed again and [] reported that the present phase was correlating hypnotic phenomena with physiological and biochemical processes. Dr. Gottlieb indicated again there was no solid operational requirement for work on hypnosis.

[] indicated that there was work going on at the present time to find concealed techniques for the induction of hypnosis, particularly by using the polygraph. He indicated that they had not reached the point where they had specific information, but as soon as available they would give information about it. He indicated that in his opinion, their work was somewhat crude, but that the results were encouraging. [] indicated

that there was considerable interest in hypnosis and reported

[] He also discussed the importance of studying mass hypnosis. [] indicated that there were

plans to get better information from the field of anthropology, which was believed to have some of the best information on the things [] was discussing. However, we have no systematic work in this area now. [] indicated that he felt studies in this area were very pertinent, particularly in conditioning agents for field assignments.

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Work with some of the psychochemicals was reported. It was indicated that the major emphasis at the present time is on studying reactions of individuals to drugs rather than the drug itself. Work is continuing on trying to learn more about how to manage, exploit, and utilize reactions for purposes pertinent to the Agency.

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Interest in interrogation techniques was discussed.

The specific project in this area is the Detroit Project which was reported in previous meetings. This is a study to attempt to get guarded information from individuals which they ordinarily refuse to reveal. It was indicated that this program was getting along fairly well and that we were in about the middle of it.

25X1A [] wanted to know what was meant by "the middle of it".

Dr. Gottlieb indicated that the experimental design had been completed. Twenty-eight individuals had been systematically studied by participating psychiatrists and a series of structured questions relating to each individual had been completed. Some of the actual interviewing had begun. However, no preliminary findings have been reported.

25X1A [] reported that in line with the original OXIVALTOP Charter, proposals had been made to expand the overt research foundation. It was reported that the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology had been incorporated in the State of New York and that there was no ostensible connection between the Society and the Agency. At the present time the Society is so closely connected with Cornell University that it is difficult to use it for contracting for external research in other research communities. Therefore, it was being proposed that the Society be completely separated from Cornell University, a full-time research director of the Society hired making it possible to keep closer touch with the research community and mount projects of interest as requirements developed.

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[] indicated that he had difficulty in mounting certain projects in which he was interested and that he would be interested in using such a group. [] wanted to know whether Security aspects of this new setup had been properly evaluated. [] wanted to know what type of person was

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being considered as full-time director. [] indicated that he had several types in mind and that this could be dis-

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
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cussed later with [] if he was interested. [] pointed out that he was not a candidate for the position but that he would welcome an opportunity to talk about what was being planned.

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With the conclusion of the brainwashing study, essentially the same group working on this problem may begin work on a study of the dynamics of defection and treason. A specific proposal in this area is now in our hands and will probably be implemented in the next year.

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The next area discussed was that of operational assistance.

It was reported that two field trials using psychochemicals as an adjunct to interrogation had been tried, that it was planned to continue to give this assistance wherever indicated and possible.

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Dr. Gottlieb reported that these had been largely successful from the standpoint of being able to take a measure of where we are and where we are going. [] wanted to know if the administration of drugs had been handled by recognized medical men. Dr. Gottlieb indicated that this was impossible under the circumstances. Medical specialists were consulted but M.D.'s did not actively participate in the interrogations. [] stated that we should consider the danger involved in not using M.D.'s and that even in certain foreign areas, M.D.'s can be provided to work with these projects, that we must be prepared to account for unfortunate reactions. He emphasized strongly that this should be taken into consideration. Dr. Gottlieb indicated that we did have this concern and that it had been taken into account.

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The representatives from other offices were asked to report on anything of significance. [] reported that there had been no AMBICONE cases and mentioned again the disguised hypnosis study. [] reported that they had been asked to produce on a crash basis a document on brainwashing, which he

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understands has received wide circulation. The document was prepared from work reported by TSS and OIR. They had tried to make it interesting and readable. He understood that there had been some lack of coordination in the final issuance of the document and they hoped there had been no embarrassment caused by this. He indicated that they had had a week to prepare the document and had been given to understand that coordination was being taken care of by someone else. [] indicated that he had no specific report to make, that there had been regular participation when opportunity had been afforded, that he worked with Security on ARTICLES when it came up. [] indicated that he had no report to make other than that he was working with [] on the hypnosis study. Dr. Gottlieb emphasized that the COMINT Working Committee, to be effective, had to work both ways; that we were reporting what we were doing and that for us to be effective, we needed to know a good deal about what others in the area were doing also. The Working Committee is an advisory group and we are willing to expose our work for scrutiny. We are inviting people to come to TSS to look us over and we would like to see more of what others are doing. [] indicated that many of the things his colleagues were doing were common practice. He suggested that many of the things the COMINT Program was studying were things that his colleagues were already aware of and have used in their professional practice for years. Dr. Gottlieb indicated that they wanted to get

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all they could from the Committee. [] stated that the Committee has a valuable place as an advisory committee. He wanted it understood that he was not complaining but that he believed more good could be accomplished by getting advice before a project was mounted rather than afterwards.

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The meeting closed with [] stating that in the absence of any advice to the contrary, the meaning of QKILLTOP goes beyond TSS alone. At the request of the Director, this mechanism is an attempt at coordinating all interested activities pertinent to the clandestine services, that this meeting had been an attempt to implement this coordination idea and that through meeting together and having this type of discussion, a better understanding of the QKILLTOP concept could be evolved.

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S E C R E T

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

XAAZ-12992

DATE: 13 January 1955

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TO :

FROM :

25X1A

SUBJECT: ARTICHOKE Operations Report, [] August-September 1954.

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
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1. Attached herewith is the report of the ARTICHOKE Team operations in [] in August and September 1954.

2. The report is forwarded to you "Eyes Only" to insure proper handling but it, of course, can be shown to such members of your Staff you feel would be interested in seeing it. If you will note, the report contains certain operational material and because of this the Security Office requires that it be treated with the highest possible security precautions.

3. Unless you feel your retention of this report is essential, it is requested that you return it to the writer when you finish with it.

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13 Jan 55
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